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#### Should means action by the agent

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The United States federal government is made up of three branches in Washington D.C.

Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98 (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292)

United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of states (originally thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections according to subject and revised from time to time COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature (the Congress) with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President) and a judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and executive (the Governor) as well as its own legal system and constitution

#### Prohibition means a law that forbids a certain action

Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary editor-in-chief, 16 [Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Pocket Edition, “prohibition”, p. 630]

prohibition. (15c) 1. A law or order than forbids a certain action.

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#### Transhistorical theories of anti-blackness naturalize violence and provide no basis for political organizing – only economic solidarity can check far-right fascism

Adolph **Reed**, Jr., 2/11/**2018**. Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in race and American politics. “Black Politics After 2016.” Non-Site.org. Article #3. https://nonsite.org/article/black-politics-after-2016.

Antiracist reactions to Bernie Sanders’s challenge and its invigoration of a redistributionist left illustrate the extent to which this race politics is at bottom a class politics. Dismissal of Sanders’s agenda and assertions that Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, living wage, and national health care, for example, somehow were not black issues underscores that this turn in black politics is **committed** to an agenda restricted to combating racial disparities **within prevailing structures of inequality**. Thus, in its purview economic redistribution seems racially inauthentic, but the annual controversies over group parity in awards of Oscars, Grammies, and other accolades appear as burning social justice issues. Only ideological blinders can block out the implication that a fair share of acclaim for Ava DuVernay, Nate Parker or Rihanna is, or should be, more important to black Americans than general access to decent, secure employment and retirement, health care and a vibrant public sector. Contemporary antiracist politics hinges on the **premise** that race, or racism, continues to determine the political, social, and economic circumstances of black people much as it did at the turn of the twentieth century or even earlier, **under slavery**. That premise underlies and drives assertions that, for example, mass incarceration is “the new Jim Crow” or a latter-day slavery. DuVernay’s documentary, 13th, all but argues explicitly that the Thirteenth Amendment’s clause exempting “punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” from its blanket prohibition of involuntary servitude was intended to leave space for reintroducing slavery, now through mass incarceration. (To those who may object that DuVernay’s documentary does not openly make such a claim, I submit reports from several colleagues at universities in different parts of the country, including my own experience at Penn, of undergraduate students who have advanced it explicitly.) Ta-Nehisi Coates hammers incessantly on the note that racism or white supremacy is a **transhistorical**, unchanging, and **ontological force** which white people generically are either committed to, driven by, or both and that that force – an urge to engage in “the plunder of black bodies” – is the singular explanation of disadvantage, inequality, or injustice experienced by black Americans. It is instructive that Coates and others who argue that racism remains the most potent force generating racially invidious inequalities commonly invoke **superficial analogies** with **earlier historical moments** when racial classification much more directly limited black people’s life chances. They do not attempt to explain how racism produces those outcomes in the present; the **analogy stands in lieu of explanation**. Michelle **Alexander** even acknowledges in the book that popularized the “new Jim Crow” analogy in relation to mass incarceration that, when all is said and done, it is **not an accurate description** of current conditions. The objective of antiracist politics is **less to explain**, and thereby **inform strategies for addressing**, the dynamics that generate and reproduce inequalities than to **assert** a claim that “racism” is the label that should attach to any and all injustices affecting black people. So, notwithstanding their dismissals of calls for grounding leftist strategy on challenging broad economic inequality as “class reductionist,” advocates of contemporary antiracism in fact embrace a **race reductionism**. There is a **logical contradiction** at the core of this form of antiracist argument. Analogies to earlier historical moments when racial classification directly constrained black people’s life chances are **so central** to the **reductionist arguments** that ground antiracist politics because racism is now negatively sanctioned in contemporary American culture. It is conventional wisdom today that racism was the principal cause, or at least principal justification, of black inequality during slavery and southern Jim Crow segregation; slavery and imposed racial hierarchy are repugnant to contemporary sensibilities. That means, however, that denunciation of current practices or relations through **analogies** to those earlier regimes of injustice seems **powerful rhetorically** precisely because of a **presumption that the claim is not true**. For the claim to have the desired force, those making it must assume that things have changed because the charge is fundamentally a denunciation of objectionable conditions or incidents as atavistic and a call for others to regard them as such. As Yale Law Professor James Forman, Jr. has argued, regarding the **trope** that mass incarceration is a new Jim Crow, such analogies both **diminish** the importance of the **victories** of the last half-century and **trivialize** the dangers and constraints – the concrete manifestations of explicitly racial oppression – that defined the earlier periods. The most **superficial knowledge** of the past and observation of the present should establish that black Americans **do not** live under the same restricted and perilous conditions now as in 1865, or for that matter 1965. The contention that racism singularly defines black reality is therefore **not an empirical claim**, even though many advancing it seem earnestly convinced that it is. It is a lament that racism persists as a force impeding black Americans’ aspirations, that no matter how successful or financially secure individual black people may be, they remain similarly subject to victimization by it. The claim carries a tacit preface: “(this incident/phenomenon/pattern makes it seem as though) nothing has changed.” In practical terms, it is an assertion that race/racism should remain the default frame of reference for discussing any and all inequalities bearing on black Americans. Persistence of racialized patterns of inequality and expressions of open bigotry give this reductionist perspective a **ring of truth**, and struggle against specifically racial injustice has always been a central component of black Americans’ political activity. In addition, for at least a quarter-century political elites, the commentariat, and academics have propagated a notion that black politics consists in drawing attention to specifically racial injustices, chiefly identifying disparities. Even black concerns with issues that affect the population across the board, e.g. **climate change**, nonetheless seem to require assertion of a particularly racial impact. The “blacks have it worse” **trope** is at this point, like an ejaculation in the Catholic liturgy, a **predictable reflex** in political argument centered on disparity as the lone truly actionable injustice. **Rhetorically**, that claim is not a call to popular political action but a demand for recognition based on moral priority. Like any ideology that gains traction, race reductionism also has a **material foundation**. Black ethnic politics consolidated around exponential growth of a stratum of office holders and public functionaries, and it has encouraged and reinforced development of what might be called a political economy of race-relations or diversity management. That includes a burgeoning, multibillion dollar diversity industry that extends to corporations and universities, where pursuit and monitoring of diversity is woven into human resource functions and overseen by in-house diversity professionals and administrators and freelance consultants. Insofar as diversity is valued in personnel policies, the significance of this political economy, and the ideology that emanates from and underwrites it, ranges far beyond those who work in the diversity/race relations economy directly. Diversity as a norm of fairness pervades the professional-managerial strata and ratifies an ideal of social justice that **harmonizes seamlessly with market-driven neoliberalism** because it combines celebration of difference and aggressive pursuit of equality of opportunity, to the **exclusion of economic redistribution**. This is the essential truth reflected in the subtitle of Walter Benn Michaels’s book, The Trouble with Diversity, namely that we – at least in the professional-managerial strata – have come to “love identity and ignore inequality.”

**The impact is mass death and global violence.**

Adrian **Parr**, **2013**. Associate Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the University of Cincinnati. *The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*. Columbia University Press. 145-7.

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like **a ticking time bomb**, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the **last decade** where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, **positive feedback mechanisms** will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the **point of no return**. We therefore need to start thinking very differently **right now**. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: **capitalism**.”5

**The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the vertically structured dual power organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.**

**Escalante 18** (Alyson Escalante, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> rvs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### Only a focus on the material conditions that create structural inequality that require and perpetuate the ideology of racism – focus on metaphysics obscures liberation

Mond 4-7-18, Revisiting “Metaphysics, Materialism, and Black Liberation”, Medium, https://medium.com/@DialecticalBlackness/revisiting-metaphysics-materialism-and-black-liberation-3a60925d6cb, accessed 9-21-2018

Revisiting “Metaphysics, Materialism, and Black Liberation” I wrote an article last year titled “Metaphysics, Materialism, and the Struggle for Black liberation”, and its sole purpose was to uplift materialism and communism in the Black Liberation struggle, talk about how anti communism benefits white supremacy, and to express that a solely metaphysical and individualist approach can not be, and historically has not been the vehicle for collective liberation. It got pretty popular, and with popularity comes criticism. Some criticisms were weak, some were absolute bullshit, but there were some that were valid, and I've been reflecting on how to re-frame my analysis in a way that is more refined. Because of the tone of this particular excerpt, my article was largely misinterpreted as more antagonistic than my intentions, and therefore the point made was missed by a lot of readers. “It is absolutely 100% necessary for Black people in the US to abandon metaphysics and adopt dialectical and historical materialism if we ever plan on achieving total liberation from the systems of White supremacy. We must also understand that capitalism in itself is a tool of White supremacy and the social hierarchies it promotes are the justification for our oppression. “Third Eyes” don’t exist, you can’t “charge” crystals in the moonlight, and a diet without pork won’t bring you closer to God, and even if it did, none of these things will help us overcome the systemic oppression we face at the hands of White supremacy. Metaphysics, Hotepism, and the works of writers like Frances Cress and the like, are obstacles in the movement for Black liberation, meant only to be trampled and exposed as the reactionary nonsense they are. They are weapons forged against the people. Our oppression is material, and only a materialist approach will liberate us.” I stand by the formulation that the road to Black liberation is a materialist road informed by Marxism-Leninism, a formulation popular among the Black Panther Party, Angela Davis, Assata Shakur, Thomas Sankara, Walter Rodney, and many other Black revolutionaries. But through social practice and criticism-self criticism I've decided it is necessary to revisit the piece and expound on my position. I hope yall analyze it and study it as thoroughly as yall did my other piece, so that we can continue to contribute to our revolutionary theory and practice. Being Determines Consciousness Consciousness is informed by social being. History, and the material world exists outside of, and independent of our perception or consciousness. The oppression of Black people, and the class struggle are material realities that are rooted in a material, recordable, and tangible history, and therefore must be combated through a materialist, and tangible approach rooted in an understanding of the historical conditions that created the current conditions for our oppression. In March 2017, I wrote an article titled “Metaphysics, Materialism and The Struggle For Black Liberation”. In the article i expressed a deep contempt for those elements and scholars who I felt blinded and confused Black people with metaphysics, mysticism, and blatant intellectual dishonesty as the primary vehicle of Black liberation. I also uplifted the names of Black communists who used a materialist analysis to inform their fight for liberation. The primary reason I wrote the piece was to essentially uplift materialism as a historic tool of Black liberation, and illustrate why the metaphysical approach to Black liberation can not be the primary vehicle for moving our liberation struggle forward. Although I stand by the formulation that a solely or even primarily metaphysical and idealist approach cannot be the vehicle for Black liberation, I feel it is necessary to reflect, and sharpen my analysis now that it is influenced by more social practice (where do correct ideas come from, after all!). Dialectical Materialism and Metaphysics Dialectical Materialism is the lens in which Marxist-Leninists analyze the world. Historical Materialism is the extension of the dialectical method to the study of social life, society, and history. The dialectical method holds that no phenomenon in nature (or society) can be understood if taken by itself, in isolation from other surrounding phenomena or material conditions. This means that every social phenomenon is informed or influenced by objective conditions, material things, and that these phenomena cannot be fully understood without understanding the conditions that create or influence them. It is very difficult to solve a problem we do not understand in its entirety. Most complex math equations require knowledge of a formula before one can even begin to solve it. Metaphysics may offer a look at a material problem, (like basic algebra may offer the values of unknown variables), but can not offer a material solution (like trying to solve a complex math equation with no formula), at least not to the problems of capitalist society and exploitation. Racism and Historical Materialism Racism is a social phenomenon. It is a system of domination created by white colonizers to justify the oppression of Black, and other non-white/colonized communities. It is necessary to differentiate between “fighting racism” and “fighting racists”. One can fight racists without fighting racism at its root. It is easy (and good!) to punch nazis, and to call out white folks who say racist things, but this individualist approach on its own is not enough to tackle the systemic and societal issue of racism. In order to fight racism, a material reality and societal institution, one must understand its material history, its relationship to state power, and the conditions that paved the way for its creation. Racism is not something innate, it is a taught behavior that served a historic purpose of domination. Any subsequent attitudes toward colonized people were informed by the creation of a race based hierarchy, but racism itself is not an all powerful, spiritual, or invisible thing. There was an intentional formula for its creation, and there is a formula for its dismantlement. The metaphysical, psychological aspect of racism and race politics paint an incomplete, and often subjective picture of racism. What is the benefit of analyzing racism and race politics in this way? What purpose does it serve other than to create a hopeless and pessimistic view of the possibility of liberation? Without a historical materialist understanding of racism and the structures and systems that uphold it, it doesn’t matter that we know what white supremacy is, because we don’t have the tools to fight it or the conditions that create it. Individualism It is also important to note that the metaphysical approach to liberation, because of its tendency to isolate social phenomena from material conditions, leads to a subjective and individualistic view of liberation. Black liberation is not a state of being for an individual, or a group of isolated individuals, but a social upheaval of Black people destroying the material conditions of our oppressors. Oppression is about a social relation to power, therefore liberation, its opposite, is a different social relationship to power. As stated in the above mentioned article, there is a reason why this particular view of “liberation” has been allowed to develop relatively unchallenged by the state: the reason concepts like class consciousness and dialectical materialism are not as accessible in Black communities is that equipped with these tools we pose a direct threat to White supremacy. If Black people collectively understood that every economic system served a historic purpose, and that it was inevitable that each system proceed the last when its historic mission is completed, and that capitalism is in its final stages and a proletarian revolution that will do away with oppressive white supremacist social hierarchies is inevitable, we would be the most powerful people in this country. Which is why Black leaders who understood these concepts were assassinated, and or white washed, and systematically erased from history and school curriculum. These groups and individuals include W.E.B. Dubois, Huey P. Newton, Assata Shakur, The Black Panther Party, the Black Liberation Army, Thomas Sankara, and Nelson Mandela, who were all communists or socialists. In their place sprang up this pro-capitalist, bourgeois Hotep nonsense, and since it poses no threat to white supremacy, it was able to develop relatively unchallenged. I understand thoroughly the importance and cultural practices to the development of a community or individual spiritual well-being however, maintaining one belief system or another does nothing for Black liberation if it does not address and confront head on the objective conditions of our oppression that is slavery, colonialism, racism and other special oppressions, capitalism, and imperialism. So sure, for an individual to be free, both the mind and body, material and “spiritual/metaphysical” must be free. However, for one to be liberated, all must be liberated, and for all to be liberated, we must see clearly, with our own eyes, the chains that hold us down. Liberation is the physical transfer of power from the oppressor to the oppressed, the destruction of oppressive hierarchies, and the creation of structures to guarantee the sustainability of the new social relationships, and nothing less.

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#### Reject the idea of a fixed neurological basis for prejudice --- It is a result of psychological out group bias --- Studies prove the amygdala’s response to coalitional habit formation is more explanatory

Mina Cikara and Jay Van Bavel 15. \*Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. \*Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. “The Flexibility of Racial Bias” Scientific American. 6-2-15. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>

It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### The undercommons fails to resolve any of their impacts

Webb 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997). Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision. There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

#### Retreat to the undercommons is ineffective for resolving structural concerns driving violene

Srnicek & Williams 15.Nick Srnicek has PhD from the London School of Economics and is a Lecturer at City University and Westminister University. Alex Williams is lecturer in sociology at the City University of London. “Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World without Work”

While nostalgia for a lost past is clearly not an adequate response, neither is today’s widespread glorification of resistance. Resistance always means resistance against another active force. In other words, it is a defensive and reactive gesture, rather than an active movement. We do not resist a new world into being; we resist in the name of an old world. The contemporary emphasis on resistance therefore belies a defensive stance towards the encroachments of expansionary capitalism. Trade unions, for instance, position themselves as resisting neoliberalism with demands to ‘save our health system’ or ‘stop austerity’; but these demands simply reveal a conservative disposition at the heart of the movement. According to these demands, the best one can hope for is small impediments in the face of a predatory capitalism. We can only struggle to keep what we already have, as limited and crisis-ridden as it may be. Even in left-leaning Latin America this trend is visible, with the most significant successes largely around efforts to impede transnational corporations, particularly in relation to mining. In many circles resistance has come to be glorified, obscuring the conservative nature of such a stance behind a veil of radical rhetoric. Resistance is seen to be all that is possible, while constructive projects are nothing but a dream.94 While it can be important in some circumstances, in the task of building a new world, resistance is futile. /// Other movements argue for an approach of withdrawal, whereby individuals exit from existing social institutions. Horizontalism is closely linked to this approach, being predicated on the rejection of existing institutions and the creation of autonomous forms of community. Indeed, the recent history of activism has tended towards such approaches.95 Often these approaches are explicitly opposed to complex societies, meaning that the ultimate implied destination is some form of communitarianism or anarcho-primitivism.96 Others suggest making oneself invisible in order to evade detection and repression by the state.97 At the extreme, some argue for what amounts to a left-wing survivalism: civilisation is in catastrophe,98 and we should therefore become invisible,99 retreat to small communes,100 and learn how to grow food, hunt, heal and defend ourselves.101 If left at the level of survivalism, these kinds of positions, while perhaps unappealing, would at least have some consistency. They at least have the virtue of being open about their implications. However, arguments for withdrawal and exit too easily confuse the idea of a social logic separate from capitalism with a social logic that is antagonistic to capitalism – or, in an even stronger claim, that poses a threat to capitalist logics.102 Yet capitalism has been and will continue to be compatible with a wide range of different practices and autonomous spaces. The Spanish town of Marinaleda offers a useful example of this. Over the course of three decades, this small community (pop. 2,700) has built up a ‘communist utopia’ that has expropriated land, built its own housing and co-operatives, kept living costs low, and provided work for everyone. Yet the limits of such an approach for transforming capitalism are quickly revealed: housing materials are provided by the regional government, agricultural subsidies come from the European Union, jobs are sustained by the rejection of labour-saving devices, income still comes from selling goods on wider capitalist markets, and businesses remain subjected to capitalist competition and the global financial crisis.103 Marinaleda is but one example of how the project of withdrawing, escaping or exiting from capitalism is still contained within a folk-political horizon, within which defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for. Yet we would argue not only that more can be hoped for (and achieved), but that, in the absence of broad and systematic contention, even those small pockets of resistance are likely to be swiftly eradicated

#### Individualist ethos actively sustains neoliberal power — focus on shared class injustice is key

Fraser 17 (Nancy — professor of philosophy and politics at The New School for Social Research, 1/28/17, “Against Progressive Neoliberalism, A New Progressive Populism,” <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/nancy-fraser-against-progressive-neoliberalism-progressive-populism>)

Johanna Brenner’s reading of my essay misses the centrality of the problem of hegemony. My main point was that the current dominance of finance capital was not achieved only by force but also by what Gramsci called “consent.” Forces favoring financialization, corporate globalization, and deindustrialization succeeded in taking over the Democratic Party, I claimed, by presenting those patently anti-labor policies as progressive. Neoliberals gained power by draping their project in a new cosmopolitan ethos, centered on diversity, women’s empowerment, and LGBTQ rights. Drawing in supporters of such ideals, they forged a new hegemonic bloc, which I called progressive neoliberalism. In identifying and analyzing this bloc, I never lost sight of the power of finance capital, as Brenner claims, but offered an explanation for its political ascendance. The lens of hegemony also sheds light on the position of social movements vis-à-vis neoliberalism. Instead of parsing out who colluded and who was coopted, I focused on the widespread shift in progressive thinking from equality to meritocracy. Saturating the airwaves in recent decades, that thinking influenced not only liberal feminists and diversity advocates who knowingly embraced its individualist ethos, but also many within social movements. Even those whom Brenner calls social-welfare feminists found something to identify with in progressive neoliberalism, and in doing so, turned a ~~blind eye~~ to its contradictions. To say this is not to blame them, as Brenner contends, but to clarify how hegemony works—by drawing us in—in order to figure out how best to build a counterhegemony. The latter idea supplies the standard for assessing the fortunes of the left from the 1980s to the present. Revisiting that period, Brenner surveys an impressive body of leftwing activism, which she supports and admires, as do I. But it does not detract from that admiration to note that this activism never rose to the level of a counterhegemony. It did not succeed, that is, in presenting itself as a credible alternative to progressive neoliberalism, nor in replacing the latter’s view of who counts as “us” and who as “them” with a view of its own. To explain why this was the case would require a lengthy study, but one thing at least is clear: unwilling to frontally challenge progressive-neoliberal versions of feminism, anti-racism, and multiculturalism, leftwing activists were never able to reach the “reactionary populists” (that is, industrial working-class whites) who ended up voting for Trump. Bernie Sanders is the exception that proves the rule. Though far from perfect, his campaign directly challenged established political fault lines. By targeting “the billionaire class,” he reached out to those abandoned by progressive neoliberalism, addressing communities struggling to preserve “middle-class” lives as victims of a “rigged economy” who deserve respect and are capable of making common cause with other victims, many of whom never had access to “middle-class” jobs. At the same time, Sanders split off a good chunk of those who had gravitated toward progressive neoliberalism. Though defeated by Clinton, he pointed the way to a potential counterhegemony: in place of the progressive-neoliberal alliance of financialization plus emancipation, he gave us a glimpse of a new, “progressive-populist” bloc combining emancipation with social protection. In my view, the Sanders option remains the only principled and winning strategy in the era of Trump. To those who are now mobilizing under the banner of “resistance,” I suggest the counter-project of “course correction.” Whereas the first suggests a doubling down on progressive-neoliberalism’s definition of “us” (progressives) versus “them” (Trump’s “deplorable” supporters), the second means redrawing the political map—by forging common cause among all whom his administration is set to betray: not just the immigrants, feminists, and people of color who voted against him, but also the rust-belt and Southern working-class strata who voted for him. Contra Brenner, the point is not to dissolve “identity politics” into “class politics.” It is to clearly identify the shared roots of class and status injustices in financialized capitalism, and to build alliances among those who must join together to fight against both of them.

**Their focus on representational politics is ineffective---neoliberalism has subordinated the role of representative politics in support of cultural commodification.**

**Eagleton 16** – Visiting Professor of Cultural Theory at Yale [Terry, “The Hubris of Culture: And the Limits of Identity Politics,” *Commonwealth*, 15 Apr 2016, p. 19-22, Emory Libraries]

The conventional postmodern wisdom is that this system has now taken a cultural turn. From the rough-spoken old industrial world, we have now evolved to capitalism with a cultural face. The role of the so-called “creative” industries, the power of the new cultural technologies, the prominent role of sign, image, brand, icon, spectacle, lifestyle, fantasy, design, and advertising: all this is taken to testify to the emergence of an “aesthetic” form of capitalism, in transit from the material to the immaterial. What this amounts to, however, is that capitalism has incorporated culture for its own material ends, not that it has fallen under the sway of the aesthetic, gratuitous, self-delighting, or self-fulfilling. On the contrary, this aestheticized mode of capitalist production has proved more ruthlessly instrumental than ever. “Creativity,” which for Karl Marx and William Morris signified the opposite of capitalist utility, is pressed into the service of acquisition and exploitation. There is no clearer example of the way capitalism is intent on assimilating what once seemed its opposite (“culture”) than the global decline of the universities. Along with the fall of Communism and the Twin Towers, it ranks among the most momentous events of our age, if somewhat less spectacular in nature. A centuries-old tradition of universities as centers of humane critique is currently being scuppered by their conversion into pseudocapitalist enterprises under the sway of a brutally philistine managerial ideology. Once arenas of critical reflection, academic institutions are being increasingly reduced to organs of the marketplace, along with betting shops and fast-food joints. They are now for the most part in the hands of technocrats for whom values are largely a matter of real estate. A new intellectual proletariat of academics is assessed by how far their lectures on Plato or Copernicus boost the economy, while unemployed graduates constitute a kind of lumpen intelligentsia. Students who are currently charged fees by the year will no doubt soon find their tutors charging by the insight. In moving some of its academic staff to new premises, one British university recently issued an edict severely restricting their ability to keep books in their minuscule offices. The dream of our universities’ boneheaded administrators is of a bookless and paperless environment, books and paper being messy, crumply stuff incompatible with a gleaming neo-capitalist wasteland consisting of nothing but machines, bureaucrats, and security guards. Since students are also messy, crumply stuff, the ideal would be a campus on which no such inconvenient creatures were in sight. The death of the humanities is now an event waiting on the horizon. What ought finally to have discredited the faith that capitalism has shifted to a new cultural mode was the financial debacle of 2008. One consequence of such upheavals is that, for an inconvenient moment, they strip the veil of familiarity from a form of life that has ceased to be regarded as a specific historical system. By throwing its inner workings into relief, they allow that life-form to be framed, objectified, and estranged. As such, it ceases to be the invisible color of everyday life and can be seen instead as a historically recent mode of civilization. Significantly, it is in the throes of such crises that even those who are supposed to run the system begin for the first time to use the word “capitalism,” rather than to speak more euphemistically of Western democracy or the Free World. They thus steal a march on some sectors of the cultural left, which in their zeal for a discourse of difference, diversity, identity, and marginality ceased to use the word “capitalism” – let alone “exploitation” or “revolution” – some decades ago. **Neoliberal capitalism has no difficulty** with terms like **“diversity” or “inclusiveness,”** as it does with the language of class struggle. It is imprudent for the Masters of the Universe to talk of capitalism, since in doing so they acknowledge that their form of life is simply one among many, that like all other such life-forms it has a specific origin, and that what was born can always die. It may be that capitalism is simply human nature, but it is hard to deny that there was a time when there was human nature but not capitalism. What the crisis of 2008 put most embarrassingly on show, however, was **how little the system had fundamentally changed**, for all the excited talk of lifestyle and **hybridity, flexible identities** and immaterial labor, rhizome-like organizations and CEOs in opennecked shirts, the disappearance of the working class and the shift from industrial labor to information technology and the service industry. Despite these innovations, the momentary crackup of the system revealed that we were still languishing in a world of mass unemployment and obscenely overpaid executives, gross inequalities and squalid public services, one in which the state was every bit as obedient a tool of ruling-class interests as the most resolutely vulgar of Marxists had ever imagined. What was at stake was not image and icon but gargantuan fraud and systemic plunder. The true gangsters and anarchists wore pinstripe suits, and the robbers were running the banks rather than raiding them. The idea of culture is traditionally bound up with the concept of distinction. High culture is a question of rank. One thinks of the great hautbourgeois families portrayed by Marcel Proust and Thomas Mann, for whom power and material wealth are accompanied by a lofty cultural tone and bear with them certain moral obligations. Spiritual hierarchy goes hand in hand with social inequality. The aim of advanced capitalism, by contrast, is to **preserve inequality while abolishing hierarchy**. In this sense, its material base is at odds with its cultural superstructure. You do not need to proclaim your superiority to other peoples in order to raid their natural resources, as long as by doing so you maintain the material inequalities between them and yourself. Whether Americans regard themselves as superior to Iraqis is really neither here nor there, given that it is political and military control over an oil-rich region they have in their sights. Culturally speaking, **late capitalism is** for the most part a matter not of hierarchy but **hybridity** – of mingling, merging, and multiplicity – while, materially speaking, the gulf between social classes assumes ultra-Victorian proportions. There are plenty of exponents of cultural studies who take note of the former but not the latter. While the sphere of consumption is hospitable to all comers, the domain of property and production remains rigidly stratified. Divisions of property and class, however, are partly masked by the levelling, demotic, spiritually promiscuous culture in which they are set, as they were not in the era of Proust and Mann. In contrast to that stately milieu, cultural and material capital now begin to split apart. The brokers, jobbers, operators, and speculators who float to the top of the system in their spiritual weightlessness are hardly remarkable for their aesthetic wisdom. The breaking down of cultural hierarchies is clearly to be welcomed. For the most part, **however**, it is less the upshot of a genuinely democratic spirit than an **effect of the commodity form**, which levels existing values rather than contesting them in the name of alternative priorities. Indeed, it represents an assault less on cultural supremacism than on the notion of value as such. The very act of discrimination becomes suspect. Not only does it involve exclusion, but it must inevitably imply the possibility of a superior vantage point, which seems offensive to the egalitarian spirit. Those who prefer Billie Holliday to Liam Gallagher (and what right have they to judge in any case?) are simply being elitist. Since nothing is more common than evaluation in pubs and sports stadiums, this aversion to ranking is itself an elitist posture. Distinctions give way to differences. The cuisine of Florence, Arizona, is neither better nor worse than that of Florence, Italy – simply different. To discriminate is unjustly to demean one thing while falsely absolutizing another. To judge that Donald Trump has less humility than Pope Francis is to thrust Trump self-righteously into the outer darkness, thereby flouting the absolute value of inclusivity; and who am I to arrogate such authority? From what odiously Olympian standpoint has one the right to pontificate that feeding a gerbil is preferable to microwaving it? The bogus populism of the commodity – its warm-hearted refusal to rank, exclude, and discriminate – is based on a blank indifference to absolutely everyone. Careless for the most part of distinctions of class, race, and gender, impeccably even-handed in its favors, it will yield itself, in the spirit of a whorehouse, to anyone with the cash to buy it. A similar indifference underlies the historic advance of multiculturalism. If the human species now has a chance, for the first time in its history, to become thoroughly hybrid, it is largely **because the capitalist market** will buy the labor-power of anyone willing to sell it, whatever their cultural origins. There are, to be sure, some transitional tensions at work here. At present, it is the economy that is promiscuously open to all comers, and a certain current of racist culture that wishes to discriminate. A capitalist market accustomed to being culturally embedded in the nation state, whose military firepower and social homogeneity served it well over the centuries, now pitches different ethnic groups together; and the racist and neo-fascist forces that this unleashes threaten to splinter the national cohesion on which a globalized economic system continues to depend. For the moment, then, culture and the economy are in some sense out of synchrony. While the latter can go global, it is not so simple for the former to wax cosmopolitan. One can, to be sure, hang around polyglot cafés or enjoy the music of a score of nations, but **culture** in this sense of the term **lacks the depth in which values** and convictions **need to be rooted**. There are indeed international allegiances for which men and women have been ready to die, not least in the socialist tradition; but culture, as Edmund Burke was aware, draws much of its resilience from local loyalties. It is hard to imagine the citizens of Bradford or Bruges throwing themselves on the barricades crying “Long live the European Union!” Far from producing citizens of the world, transnational capitalism tends to breed parochialism and insecurity among a large swathe of those subject to its sway; and it is toward racism and chauvinism, not into cosmopolitan cafés, that this insecurity is likely to impel them. While some forms of culture have increased in significance, others have diminished. Nobody believes any longer that art can fill the shoes of the Almighty. Culture as a critique of civilization has been increasingly **eroded**, undermined among other things by the postmodern prejudice that any such critique must address itself to an illusory social totality from an equally illusory standpoint of absolute knowledge. It has also come under siege from the intellectual treason of the universities. The critical or utopian dimensions of the concept of culture are rapidly declining. If **culture signifies a corporate way of life**, as it does when we speak of deaf culture, beach culture, police culture, café culture, and so on, then it is hard for it to serve at the same time as a yardstick by which to assess such forms of life, or to evaluate social existence in general. So-called identity politics are not remarkable for their self-critical spirit. The point of engaging in, say, English folk culture is to affirm English folksiness, not to question it. Nobody becomes a Morris dancer in order to satirize the whole sorry business. At the same time, there are political cultures (gay, feminist, ethnic, musical, and so on) that are indeed deeply critical of the status quo. They inherit the dissenting impulse of Kulturkritik while jettisoning its spiritual elitism. They also reject its abstract utopianism for a specific way of life. If they challenge the patrician remoteness of the tradition that passes from Friedrich Schiller to D. H. Lawrence, with its disdain for modernity, they also differ from those corporate life-forms that exist simply to affirm a particular social identity, rather than to cast a cold eye on the social order as a whole. Nobody but the **most sorely misguided of citizens becomes a Morris dancer in order to overthrow capitalism**, whereas many a feminist has greeted the prospect with acclaim. Political cultures of this kind combine critique with solidarity in something like the style of the traditional labor movement. Yet though identity politics and multiculturalism can be radical forces, **they are not** for the most part **revolutionary** ones. Some of these political currents have largely abandoned their hopes in this regard, while others never entertained them in the first place. They differ in this respect from the powers that drove the British from India and the Belgians from the Congo. Those campaigns were quite properly a matter of expulsion and exclusion, not in the first place of plurality and inclusivity. They also **envisaged a world beyond the horizon of capitalist reality**, even if those visions were to be for the most part thwarted. Today’s cultural politics, by contrast, is not generally given to challenging those priorities. It speaks the language of gender, identity, marginality, diversity, and oppression, **but not** for the most part the idiom of state, property, class-struggle, ideology, and exploitation. Roughly speaking, it is the difference between anti-colonialism and postcolonialism. Cultural politics of this kind are in one sense the very opposite of elitist notions of culture. Yet they share in their own way that **elitism’s** overvaluing of cultural affairs, as well as its **distance from** the prospect of **fundamental change**. What, finally, of the so-called War on Terror? Is it not here that we should look for the persistence of cultural questions in political society? Perhaps one might see the collapse of the World Trade Center as a surreal explosion of archaic cultural forces at the very heart of modern civilization. The clash between Western capitalism and radical Islam, however, is primarily a geopolitical affair, not a cultural or religious one, rather as the recent conflict in Northern Ireland had little to do with religious conviction. There has been much talk in the region of the need for an amicable encounter between what is blandly known as “the two cultural traditions,” Unionist and nationalist. It is thus that a history of injustice and inequality, of Protestant supremacy and Catholic subjugation, can be converted into an innocuous question of alternative cultural identities. Culture becomes a convenient way of **displacing politics**. As in the case of revolutionary nationalism, culture may supply some of the terms on which material and political battles are joined, but it does not constitute their substance. By and large, fundamentalism is the creed of those who feel abandoned and humiliated by modernity, and the forces responsible for this pathological state of mind, like those that give birth to multiculturalism, are far from cultural in themselves. In fact, the central questions that confront a humanity moving into the new millennium are not cultural ones at all. They are far more mundane and material than that. War, hunger, drugs, arms, genocide, disease, ecological disaster: all of these have their cultural aspects, but culture is not the core of them. If those who speak of culture cannot do so without inflating the concept, it is perhaps better for them to remain silent.

**Their focus on creating individual care within this space and institutional spaces makes collective struggle impossible and essentializes black experience.**

Adolph **Reed**, September **2018**. Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. “The Trouble With Uplift.” No. 41. https://thebaffler.com/salvos/the-trouble-with-uplift-reed.

The notion that black Americans are political agents just like other Americans, and can forge their own tactical alliances and coalitions to advance their interests in a pluralist political order is **ruled out** here on principle. Instead, blacks are **imagined as so abject** that only extraordinary intervention by committed black leaders has a prayer of producing real change. This **pernicious assumption** **continually subordinates** actually existing history to imaginary cultural narratives of individual black heroism and helps drive the intense – and myopic – opposition that many antiracist activists and commentators express to Bernie Sanders, **social democracy**, and a politics centered on economic inequality and working-class concerns. Class Is Dismissed The **striking hostility** to such a politics within the higher reaches of antiracist activism illustrates the extent to which what bills itself as black politics today **is in fact a class politics**: it is not interested in the concerns of working people of whatever race or gender. Indeed, a spate of recent media reports have retailed evidence that upper-class black Americans may be experiencing stagnant-to-declining social mobility – which is taken as prima facie evidence of the stubbornly racist cast of the American social order: Even rich professionals like us, elite commentators suggest, are denied the right to secure our own class standing. It is also telling that the study that provoked the media reports – Raj Chetty, et al., “Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective” – rehearses the hoary recommendation that “reducing the intergenerational persistence of the black-white income gap will require policies whose impacts cross neighborhood and class lines and increase upward mobility specifically for black men.” These include “mentoring programs for black boys, efforts to reduce racial bias among whites, or efforts to facilitate social interaction across racial groups within a given area.” That’s **pretty thin gruel**, warmed over bromides and all too familiar paternalism and no actually redistributive policies at all. In this context the pronounced animus trained on the figure of the “white savior” emerges as litmus test for the critical role of racial gatekeeper in respectable political discourse. The gatekeeping question has, for more than a century, focused on who speaks for black Americans and determines the “black agenda.” And the status of black leader, spokesperson, or “voice” has always been a direct function of contested class prerogative, dating back a century and more to Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, Ida B. Wells, and Anna Julia Cooper. Specifically, the gatekeeping function is the obsession of the professional-managerial strata who pursue what Warren has described as “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” How do “black leaders” become recognized? The answer is the same now as for Washington in the 1890s; recognition as a legitimate black leader, or “voice,” requires ratification by elite opinion-shaping institutions and individuals. Gatekeeping hasn’t been the exclusive preoccupation of Bookerite conservatives or liberals like Du Bois. Even militant black nationalists and racial separatists like Marcus Garvey and the leaders of the Nation of Islam have pursued validation as black leaders from dominant white elites to support programs of racial “self-help” or uplift. From Black Power to Black Lives Matter, claimants to speak on behalf of the race have courted recognition from the Ford Foundation and other white-dominated nonprofit philanthropies and NGOs. And the emergence of cable news networks and the blogosphere have exponentially expanded the number and types of entities that can anoint race leaders and representative voices. This new welter of platforms and voices seeking to promulgate and validate the acceptable terms of black leadership has made the category seem all the more beyond question, as black racial voices pop up all over the place all the time. So, for example, the self-proclaimed black voice Tia Oso was brought front and center in the 2015 Netroots Presidential Town Hall featuring Martin O’Malley and Bernie Sanders, where she proclaimed that “black leadership must be foregrounded and central to progressive strategies.” Likewise, the presumed moral authority of race leadership enabled Marissa Johnson and Mara Jacqueline Willaford to prevent Sanders from speaking at a Social Security rally in Seattle – as though the long-term viability of Social Security were not a black issue. The instant recourse to a posture of leadership is how random Black Lives Matter activists and a vast corps of pundits and bloggers are able to issue ex cathedra declarations about which issues are and are not pertinent to black Americans. Voices in a Political Vacuum The freelance black leader – and its more recent, superficially more pluralist incarnation, the black “voice” – is a legacy harking back to the era of massive black disfranchisement at the end of the nineteenth century. It also has drawn considerable staying power from the amorphous concept of “race relations,” according to which, in the judgment of historian Michael R. West in his 2006 study The Education of Booker T. Washington, “blacks and whites – or ‘black America’ and ‘white America’ – are basic, indivisible units of political interest. . . . The race relations framework appealed to white elites because it sidestepped the troublesome fact of blacks’ constitutional claims to full and equal citizenship by proposing a focus on the evanescent issue of how the ‘races’ relate as an alternative to matters like denial of rights and equal protection under the law.” West also notes that “interests and aspirations of politicians and ministers, workers and businessmen, parents and teachers would no longer be expressed by way of the normal, if potentially messy, institutional channels through which Americans settled their conflicts and competition. Instead, they would be mediated through the good offices of ‘Negro leaders,’ ever mindful of where their mandate comes from and the requirement placed on them as a first principle ‘to cement the friendship of the two races.’” The warrant to cement the friendship of the races, of course, meant framing racial comity on terms acceptable to the dominant white elites who ratified claims to black leadership and decided which of those claims were “responsible” or “right-thinking.” The race-relations mindset also shaped the ideological outlook of racial advocacy and uplift groups like the National Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Both groups, for example, were hesitant to support labor organization for black workers during the Great Depression since they relied on donations from liberal funders steeped in anti-union sentiments; also, apostles of racial uplift tended to come from a professional-managerial background themselves, again highlighting the extent to which there has always been a class dimension to black politics. None of this is to suggest that claimants to race leadership even in the Bookerite era were dupes or supplicants who were not sincerely committed “race men” and “race women” in the parlance of the time. Rather, as Warren, West, and others have argued, the stratum of the black population that tended to incubate aspiring race leaders also cohered around views of proper racial agendas – what the “race” needed and how its position in the world could be advanced, i.e., what constituted “uplift” – that also **reflected the priorities of philanthropic elites**. These mutually dependent groups were likely to share a baseline sense of how American society should be structured – and specifically of how to manage existing class hierarchies so as to better navigate blacks’ place within them. That said, most racial advocates were doubtless more committed than their patrons to the pursuit of full equality of opportunity. The Revolution Will Be Televised The terms of this tacit social contract shifted with the victories of the civil rights movement and the cultural insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s; suddenly, raw racial subordination no longer commanded uncritical assent from the liberal wing of the American power elite. At the same time, though, this civil rights revolution and its aftermath worked to obscure the striking continuity in the underlying socioeconomic dynamics that continue to validate race leaders, spokespersons, or representative voices. The open – or at least public – performance of supplication before powerful elites is no longer necessary or desirable for validation. Indeed, Black Power “militancy” and various cultural-separatist projects aligned with black nationalism supported new claimants’ discourse of authenticity – one that gained wider credence via assertive demands for equal power instead of humble requests for recognition. On the **surface**, at least, it now appeared that the essentially dependent relation between white liberal arbiters or power and their black counterparts had morphed into something more radical. And this new assertive liturgy of dependence works to the benefit of both grantors and grantees of political legitimacy and economic largess – players who all shared a stake in projecting an appearance of the anointed’s racial authenticity. Today, this **liturgy** is everywhere on display – along with the same power dynamics that sustain it. In academic institutions and programs, op-ed pages, magazines and blogs, and of course cable television newschat programs, we see a steady stream of racial voices and leaders plotting out the permissible boundaries of black authenticity and black leadership values. This surface accord within the charmed circle of soi-disant black leaders **reinforces the illusion**, just as was the case in the aftermath of the civil rights era, that they have all emerged from the grassroots. The increasing significance of the corporate newsfotainment industry means that things could scarcely seem otherwise to most casual viewers and audiences. The leading platforms of respectable black discourse – including the various internet platforms that encourage freelance chatter – reinforce the sense that those **purporting** to express the black point of view arise naturally from within the quasi-mythic “black community.” But of course the immediacy of all these venues, despite their many claims to have vanquished old-guard “gatekeepers” and “legacy media” forums, has rendered the selection processes behind the elevation of this or that leadership “voice” almost completely opaque. Not all points of view can gain a hearing, after all. Terms like “responsible” and “right-thinking” seldom slip into public discussion anymore because they evoke explicit subordination; nevertheless, sporadic calls for recognized black voices to distance themselves from “extremist” or otherwise unacceptable views expressed by other black “voices” – most recently via another predictably vile anti-Semitic utterance from Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan – reveal that such criteria are critical in setting the boundaries of public legitimacy for aspiring black leaders. Another telling instance of the same dynamic ocurred when Keith Ellison, the African American Muslim congressman from Minnesota, sought to chair the Democratic National Committee as a Sanders supporter; here again, the sensible centrist consensus counteroffensive depicted Ellison as simply too fringe and divisive a figure to command authority in the sacred political mainstream. Alongside the close vetting of respectable black voices in the media mainstream there’s been a prolonged atrophy of popular political mobilization behind issues of economic equity for black Americans. Taken together, these trends have opened a shortcut path to broader public recognition for self-styled race leaders. For more than a decade, it has been common to encounter young people who enter graduate programs in order to prepare for careers as racial voices or “public intellectuals,” hoping to obtain a credential that can procure valuable space on the Huffington Post, the root.com, or MSNBC. In the quest for mediagenic legitimacy, some eager race pundits have launched organizations that are **barely more than letterhead or résumé entries**; these feints are likewise often accompanied by Potemkin-style protest activism, including many of the donor-driven groups aligned with Black Lives Matter, or glorified photo-ops intended to evoke mass agitation. Among this cohort of racial voices, the essential qualification for recognition seems to be inclination to declaim on the intractability of an undifferentiated, **ahistorical racism** as a fetter on all black Americans’ life chances across the sweep of the nation’s history. As a corollary, they’re **required** to insist that objection to generic racial disparities constitutes the totality of black political concerns. Reduced and Abandoned The politics thus advanced is **profoundly race-reductionist**, discounting the value of both political agency and the broad pursuit of political alliances within a polity held to be intractably and irredeemably devoted to white supremacy. This **fatalistic outlook** works seamlessly to reinforce the status of racial voices who emphasize the interests and concerns of a singular racial collectivity. Central to these pundits’ message is the assertion that blacks have it worse, in every socio-cultural context that might be adduced. This refrain is also **consistent** in two important ways with the **reigning ideology of neoliberal equality**. First, the insistence that disparities of racial access to power are the most meaningful forms of inequality strongly reinforces the neoliberal view that inequalities generated by capitalist market forces are **natural** and lie beyond the scope of intervention. And second, if American racism is an intractable, **transhistorical** force – indeed, an **ontological one**, as Ta-Nehisi Coates has characterized it – then it lies beyond structural political intervention. In other words, Coates and other race-firsters diminish the significance of the legislative and other institutional victories won since Emancipation, **leaving us with only exhortations to individual conversion and repentance as a program**. This is why, for example, Coates and other proponents of reparations seem unconcerned with the **strategic problem** of piecing together the kind of interracial popular support **necessary to actually prevail on the issue**. Such problems do not exist for them because the role of the representative black leader or voice is precisely to **function as an alternative to political action**. Instead, the order of the day is typically to perform **racial authenticity** in a way that doubles as an appeal for moral recognition from those with the power to bestow it. Winning anything politically – policies or changes in power relations – is not the point. That is why the jeremiads offered by contemporary racial voices so commonly boil down to calls for “conversations about race” or equally vapid abstractions like “racial reckoning” or “coming to terms with” a history defined by racism. The black leadership role was always **at best** an **accommodation to disfranchisement**, going back to its first modern incarnation with Booker T. Washington and his cohort of racial advocates. It is a **politics of elite transaction**. That is not in itself necessarily a bad thing – President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “black cabinet,” or Federal Council of Negro Affairs, advised him on matters related to black Americans. But unlike today’s freelance racial voices, they were administration functionaries, and most had standing in racial advocacy, education, labor, and government institutions prior to joining the “cabinet.” The backdoor dealings between King and Johnson during the Selma campaign that DuVernay found too messy to include in her portrait of King’s heroic persona were also part of mundane political maneuvering, the inside-outside game of institutional politics. King and the SCLC, like FDR’s black cabinet, had constituencies that underwrote their standing as representatives of racial interest – which in turn gave them leverage to make political demands and pursue policy agendas. A. Philip Randolph used the March on Washington Movement to pressure President Roosevelt in 1941 to issue “Executive Order 8802,” prohibiting racial discrimination in the national defense industry. Randolph, Bayard Rustin, the Negro American Labor Council, and others organized the 1963 March on Washington as part of an inside-outside strategy to build support for a jobs program and passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. All this painstaking political effort could not be farther from the careerist pursuits of contemporary racial voices, whose standing depends entirely on the favor of powerful opinion-shaping elites in corporate media and elsewhere. Thus, for example, Touré Neblett and others in MSNBC’s stable were unceremoniously expunged from the lineup of talking heads when the network reconfigured its marketing priorities. More dramatically, Melissa Harris-Perry, apparently believing that her viewing audience gave her leverage, openly rebuffed the network’s demand to reorient her program to fit in with its election coverage. In short order, she and her program vanished without a trace from its schedule. Such incidents, and scores of others like them, make it indelibly clear where the lines of authority run when it comes to winning elite-media recognition as a black voice. For Their Own Good The race voices I’ve discussed express a particular class perspective among black Americans, one that harmonizes with left-neoliberal notions of justice and equality. That harmony may help explain why those racial voices – like the black political class in general – are so intent on disparaging the **social-democratic politics** associated with Bernie Sanders, even though a 2017 Harvard-Harris survey found that Sanders was far more popular with African Americans than with any other demographic category except declared Democrats. He boasted a 73 percent favorable rating among black voters – higher than his approval numbers among Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and considerably higher than those for whites or even 18-34 year-olds. This disjunction between popular opinion and the priorities of the black chattering class underscores the extent to which the racial programs and priorities advanced by those recognized black voices remain much as they were in the Age of Washington. Now as then, we have a leadership stratum dedicated to the class-skewed pursuit of “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” And the net effect of this top-down model of black discourse is to tether a politics of racial representation to the ruling-class agendas that generate and intensify inequality and insecurity for working people across American society, including among the ranks of black Americans. Black Clintonites, like Congressmen John Lewis (D-GA), James Clyburn (D-SC) and Cedric Richmond (D-LA), all clearly displayed this commitment during the 2016 Democratic primaries when they attacked Sanders as “irresponsible” in calling for non-commodified public goods in education, health care, and other areas. Richmond’s rebuke was especially telling in that he couched it in terms of his role as chair of the Congressional Black Caucus and the group’s “responsibility to make sure to know that young people know that” a social-democratic agenda is “too good to be true.” Richmond’s invocation of civic instruction for the young may be revealing in another way. Lurking beneath that piety is the deeply sedimented common sense of underclass ideology, which posits a population mired in pathologies and hemmed in by an overwhelming racism, and the corollary of interventions aiming to enhance capabilities for individual mobility. (It is, indeed, this same tacit rhetoric of permanent crisis that fuels the notion that black young people must be raised on a diet of inspirational movies.) This vision of unyielding black pathology is yet another testament to the harmony of antiracist and neoliberal ideologies – and it, too, harks directly back to the origins of the black leadership caste at the dawn of the last century. Washington and Du Bois, together with Garvey and other prominent racial nationalists, envisioned their core constituency as a politically mute black population in need of tutelage from their ruling-class-backed leaders. Touré F. Reed persuasively argues that the mildly updated version of this vision now serves as an essential cornerstone of the new black professional-managerial class politics. Underclass mythology grounds professional-class claims to race leadership, while providing the normative foundation of uplift programs **directed toward enhancing self-esteem rather than the material redistribution of wealth and income**. Exhortations to celebrate and demand accolades, career opportunities, and material accumulation for black celebrities and rich people – e.g., box office receipts for black filmmakers or contracts and prestigious appointments for other well-positioned black people – as a racial politics are consistent with the sporadic eruptions of “Buy Black” campaigns since the 1920s and 1930s. Such efforts stood out in stark contrast to more working-class based “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns that demanded employment opportunities in establishments serving black neighborhoods. Like “Buy Black” campaigns, which seem to have risen again from the tomb of petit-bourgeois wishful thinking, projections of successes for the rich and famous as generic racial victories depend on a sleight-of-hand that treats benefits for any black person as benefits for all black people. This brings to mind comedian Chris Rock’s quip that he went to his mailbox every day for two weeks after the not guilty verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial looking for his “O. J. prize,” only to be disappointed. Pain and Proprietorship At times, this tendency to **absorb the plural into the singular** can be strikingly crude and transparently self-interested. The torrent of hostility directed at Rachel Dolezal for having represented herself as black rested on groundless – sometimes entirely made up – claims that she had appropriated jobs, awards, and other honorifics intended for blacks. In addition to the annual contretemps over whether blacks win enough of the most prestigious Oscars, recent racial controversies in the art world illustrate how easily the narrowest guild concerns can masquerade as burning matters of racial justice. The Brooklyn Museum’s hiring of a white person as consulting curator of African art sparked objections that the hire perpetuated “pervasive structures of white supremacy in the art field.” The 2017 furor over the Whitney Biennial’s display of Dana Schutz’s “Open Casket” – inspired by the infamous 1955 photograph of Emmett Till’s brutalized body – reduced to a question of ownership of “black suffering,” or more accurately, of the right to represent and materially benefit from the representation of black suffering. The protesters’ objection, as Walter Benn Michaels put it succinctly, was that “black pain belongs to black artists.” It’s worth noting that one of the leading critics of the painting and its display was Hannah Black, who contended that “non-black people must accept that they will never embody and cannot understand” the gesture Till’s mother, Mamie, made in insisting on an open-casket funeral. Black, who not only called for the painting to be removed from display, but also offered an “urgent recommendation” that it be destroyed, is a Briton who lives in Berlin. From a different standard of cultural proprietorship, one might argue that Schutz, as an American, has a stronger claim than Black to interpret the Till story. After all, the segregationist Southern order and the struggle against that order, which gave Till’s fate its broader social and political significance, were historically specific moments of a distinctively American experience. In fact, most claims of cultural ownership and charges of appropriation are **bogus**. While sometimes they provide an instrumental basis for tortious claims, as in pursuit of restitution for Nazi and other imperialists’ looting of artifacts, more often they posit a **dead-end conflation** of fixed and impermeable racial identity with cultural expression. As Michaels has argued for more than twenty-five years, the discourse of cultural ownership stems from the pluralist mindset that treats “culture” as a key marker of social groups and thereby **inscribes it as racial essentialism**. In order to legitimate what Michaels describes as “racial rent-seeking,” a curiously inflexible brand of race-first neoliberalism has taken root in American political discourse, proposing a trickle-down model of racial progress, anchored in the mysticism of organic black community. Against this exoticized backdrop, neoliberal race leaders stage the beguiling fantasy that individual “entrepreneurialism” is the key path to rising above one’s circumstances – i.e., the standard American social myth that obscures the deeper need to combat systemic inequalities. The most tragic, and pathetic, expressions of this faith are the versions of the “gospel of prosperity,” which fuse pop self-realization psychology and a barely recognizable Christianity to **exploit desperation** and the desire for life with dignity and respect among their black-majority congregations. The **false hopes** of the **prosperity gospel** encourage already vulnerable people to fall prey to all sorts of destructive get-rich-quick schemes; they are the “sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions” channeled through a market-idolatrous Protestant psychobabble. Black ministers and other proponents of entrepreneurialist ideology as racial uplift also played a largely unrecognized role in pushing subprime mortgages, and even payday loans, in black communities. The racial trickle-down success myth is partly a vestige of an earlier era, during which individual black attainments could be seen as testaments to the race’s capacities – and a refutation of the white-sanctioned view of black people as generally inferior. Even then, however, this model of black uplift was enmeshed in the race theory of the time – notably the belief that a race’s capacities were indicated by the accomplishments of its “best” individuals – and it was always inflected with the class perspectives of those who saw themselves as such individuals. The class legacies of this foundational moment in modern black politics may well contribute to the firm insistence among today’s “black voices” that slavery and Jim Crow mark the transcendent truth of black Americans’ experience in the United States – and that an irreducible racism is the source of all manifest racial inequality. That diagnosis certainly **masks class asymmetries** among black Americans’ circumstances as well as in the remedies proposed to improve them. Nevertheless, we continue to indulge the politically wrong-headed, counterproductive, and even reactionary features of the “representative black voice” industry in whatever remains of our contemporary public sphere. And we never reckon with the truly disturbing presumption that any black person who can gain access to the public microphone and performs familiar rituals of “blackness” should be recognized as expressing significant racial truths and deserves our attention. This presumption rests on the unexamined premise that blacks share a common, singular mind that is at once radically unknowable to non-blacks and readily downloaded by any random individual setting up shop as a racial voice. And despite what all of our age’s many heroic narratives of individualist race-first triumph may suggest to the casual viewer, **that premise is the essence of racism**.

# 2NC

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### 2NC --- AT: DA’s O/V

#### Their impact turns and Moten posits an antiformalism that occludes theory and practice – it eviscerates attempts at social construction that are required to organize the social, this undermines the effectiveness of the theory – instead, we should instead embrace forms as a means of grounding ontology and liberation

Kornbluh, Anna. The Order of Forms : Realism, Formalism, and Social Space, University of Chicago Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jccc-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5968689>. Created from jccc-ebooks on 2021-10-08 03:44:39. --- thanks vega

Political formalism approaches literary works like the realist novel as utopian models of possible socialities confi gured to project and integrate elementary structures of spontaneous organization. Such models theorize this structuration as a basis of, rather than obstacle to, political freedom itself. A formalism of the political encounters the forms that comprise our social interdependence as mere forms, ungroundable yet indispensable, promoting a core idea of form as something purposeful but simultaneously emergent, something conspicuously constructed and efficacious, something spontaneous and malleable. This core idea encompasses the dialectic of form rejected or otherwise suppressed amid the proliferation of theoretical and practical antiformalisms— from Adorno and Agamben to Foucault, Said, Edelman, Latour, Hardt and Negri, and Moten— since those so thoroughly contest the exclusions of any given construction, so persuasively audit the reifi cations that occlude reformability. The allergy to form in the humanities has had very deleterious effects in both practice and theory. In practice, intellectuals based in the humanities have often had trouble constituting collective bodies. We can count that in the failure to mass unionize or otherwise politically collectively respond to the massive restructuring of labor in higher education in the past four decades. We can count that in automatic disdain for the important means of power in offi cial politics (institutions, elections, legislation) as irredeemably tainted. But we can also count it in a more broad failure of humanists, experts with an incomparably strong aptitude for articulating values, to impart constructive visions of cultural production, equality, and fl ourishing that could guide the elocution of concrete political demands such as debt- free education and art for all. In many ways, these failures align: lacking a robust positive representation of what the study of literature, art, and culture offers beyond historic preservation or cautionary catalogues of domination, humanists have been unable to think their own faculties for composition— for making ideas of public goods, for making institutions that uphold the *universitas* in the university, for making spaces adequate for human beings, for making equipment for living, for making forms of and for sustained collectivity— and have consequently misperceived their own position in an ever- intensifying class war. The ensuals of refl exive antiformalism extend beyond this realm of tactics and strategy. Theory itself, the fraught practice of situated abstraction, has been diminished. Theorists have consigned themselves to immanentizing domination, to the lamenting of institutionality, normativity, and the state, and recently to abjuring critique in favor of empiricizing description. Forfending theory’s wonderful openings for wild norms, conducive institutions, and emancipatory syntheses, we have constrained theory’s projective capacity to the minimal axes of ethical hospitality for provisional encounters, ephemeral affects of oceanic connectivity, and fl eeting specters of whatever being. We have indicted art’s complicities, not elaborated its moxie. We have prophylactically refused reifi cation, messianized revolution, forestalled agency, and thus impeded most theorizing of sustainability, effectivity, re- forming. In thrall to these subtractions, we have forsworn the bigness, velocity, and liberating abstraction of theory itself. As an alternative to these practical and theoretical legacies, political formalism commits to structuration as such, tracing the radically essential, radically ungroundable installation of social order and pivoting that formal recognition into the opportunity for constructing new socialities, new constitutions, new orders of forms. Although thus at odds with many theoretical hegemonies of the recent past, political formalism as I draft it can indeed claim theoretical legacies from the art and thought of the more distant past. My readings of *The German Ideology*, *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, and Lacan’s mathematics all suggest that Marxism and psychoanalysis together provide very astute frameworks for fathoming the groundless essentiality of social relations, and in this respect their own contributions to political theory are incredibly valuable. Where canonical political theory across millennia endeavors to ground the state successively in divine right, contract, consent, theological seduction, or the justness of democracy, Marxism and psychoanalysis directly avow the impossibility of grounding forms of political collectivity. Such avowal opposes not only contemporary theory adages but also those crucial arcs of critique that would seek to dismiss social forms on these grounds of ungrounds— emblematized in Walter Benjamin’s confl ation of abyssal constitution with “violence.”1 Instead, Marx’s emphasis on spontaneously emergent social forms and on the liberatory dimension of normativity, along with Freud’s and Lacan’s emphasis on the socio- symbolic fi eld as the condition of possibility for the subject’s existence and its enjoyment, helps to illuminate a path for theory that would embrace the affordances of form while conceding its arbitrary character.

#### their retreat to a destituent paradigm and anti-form is impossible and cedes the positivism of form

Kornbluh, Anna. The Order of Forms : Realism, Formalism, and Social Space, University of Chicago Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jccc-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5968689>. Created from jccc-ebooks on 2021-10-08 03:44:39. --- thanks vega

Against this ubiquity of unsettling and unmaking, The Order of Forms embraces projects of building. As its title suggests, the book principally afﬁrms the order made by forms and the forms made by order. Form is composed relationality. Little precedes this composed relationality, yet the lure of formlessness is powerful and distorting. Against this lure, I argue that forming is a value unto itself: a value that animates literature, and a value that formalist literary critics can embrace as an alternative to destituent theory. Formalism should study how to compose and to direct— rather than ceaselessly oppose— form, formalization, and forms of sociability. A formalism that professes such constituency might be deemed “political formalism” on account of its willingness to entertain the political imagining that can issue from studying forms, and even more so because its elementary afﬁrmation addresses the formed quality of the political as such. Contrary to the destituent paradigm’s ideal of formlessness, a formalism of the political avouches the constitution and agency of forms, underscoring that life itself essentially depends upon composed relations, institutions, states. If such a formalism were to animate critical appraisals, we might ﬁnd new opportunities for engaging with aesthetic productions as sites for and modalities of thinking about this essentiality, for mediating social building, for building in criticism projects for social composition. Political formalism evaluates form’s composedness and form’s agency— the contingent and emergent quality of form’s relationality, the dispensation of interrelation and what relations make possible— and thereby approaches politics and aesthetics from the purview of the constitution of social form, not just destituent dismantling. Where anarcho-vitalism refuses form and deplores standing formations of the sort epitomized by the state, instead elevating hybridity, evanescence, and particularity, political formalism ratiﬁes form itself. It admits the fundamentality of formal collectivities and formalized sociability; it avows structuration in general, thus chartering improvisation and contestation. In a context in which scholars rallying under the banners of surface reading, postcritique, the descriptive turn, cognitive studies, and some strains of affect theory have arguably resigned criticism’s political aims, and in the now permanent emergency imperiling university study of literature, I contend that formalism not only comprises the central proﬁciency of literary critics, but also funds their unique worldly purchase: ideas about making, about making relations, about making spaces and orders deliberately and justly. The study of literary form is at root the analysis of how language furnishes a medium for composing sustained repetitions, delimited contours, performative conjurings, and synthetic abstractions. Experts in these constructions are equipped, I contend, to understand and even engineer parallel formations in the phenomenal realm of everyday life, in everyday spaces in everyday institutions, as these too emerge in the medium of language. What norms ought be supported by such constructions is a question for collective answering; but I do propose that a constructive commitment— a formalist commitment to the essentiality of form, to its ontological dimension, to the marvels of building— amounts to its own norm, since its aims differ so dramatically from the destituent paradigm. Embracing form serves as the foundation for projects to constitute and institute collective values; regarding form as essential for living serves as the foundation for other normative claims to justice, such as the equitable beneﬁt from form’s provisions.

### TVA

#### TVA: The United States federal government should expand the scope of its antitrust law to include forced labor as an anticompetitive business practice

**Hunt, 21** (Breann Hunt, Bachelors degree from Brigham Young University majoring in Strategic Management, April 2021, accessed on 6-21-2021, Scholarsarchive.byu, "Eliminating Forced Labor in American Corporations and Their Supply Chain: Existing Solutions and Failures", https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1346&context=byuplr)//Babcii

D. Forced Labor and Its Effect on the Free Market and Antitrust Violations The federal government of the United States has developed legislation to promote rigorous business competition in the marketplace. Examples include **antitrust laws** and SEC requirements which **ensure** fair **competition and freedom** of information in the market by breaking up market monopolies and issuing property rights. In relation to supply chain management, antitrust laws enforced by the FTC examine firms’ supply chains. The FTC claims that, “A vertical [supply chain] arrangement may violate the antitrust laws [...] if it reduces competition among firms at the same level (say among retailers or among wholesalers) or prevents new firms from entering the market.”22 Supreme Court precedent dictates that antitrust issues be examined through a reasonable framework that includes a consideration of the effect of a firm’s actions on competition within the market. The FTC claims that, “[price advantage through supply chain] must be weighed against any reduction in competition from the restrictions.”23 While price advantage is not illegal, gaining market high ground through forced labor creates an unfair vertical supply chain that tilts economic competition in favor of the company with human rights violations. According to the FTC, “a vertical arrangement may violate the antitrust laws, however, if it reduces competition among firms at the same level (say among retailers or among wholesalers) or prevents new firms from entering the market.”24 Sourcing goods through illegal labor reduces competition by unfairly lowering the cost of goods sold for firms, thus enabling them to undercut competitor pricing. This does have the effect of reducing the advantages of free market competition and prevents new firms from entering the market. For example, a study done on the price increase upon Fair Trade certification of coffee brands (an industry often associated with forced labor in its supply chains), researchers found that price increases did not reflect the consumer’s willingness to pay.25 A Fair Trade certification is a third party supply chain certification that audits participating businesses to ensure their subcontracted labor is well paid and free from slave labor.26 The study further claims that, “Fair Trade Certification has an impact of raising the price of coffee 22% compared to non-Fair Trade coffees,” while “Fair Trade Certification increases the premium consumers are willing to pay for coffee by 1.1%.”27 Thus, while **brands that secure their supply chains from** human rights violations must necessarily **increase their prices**, **there is not a corresponding willingness to pay the additional price f**rom consumers. The study cited deals with a common consumer good, coffee, where firms compete with similar prices and four brands represent more than 55% of total market share.28 Other common consumer goods have similar industry structures, such as Nestle, where large competitors compete on price for market share. When industries compete on price, the likelihood of ethical supply chain efforts creating an effective competitive advantage with the majority of consumers decreases. While there is certainly evidence of forced labor within coffee supply chains,29 **ethically sourced** coffee **brands have not made a significant entrance** into the mainstream market. This represents how dominant, global firms with no legal repercussions for their human rights violations suppress the expansion of ethically sourced U.S. competitors. In the Supreme Court filings for Doe v. Nestle, competitors claim that Nestle violated their right to the free market. According to several firms who had taken measures to ethically source their product, “As slave-free cocoa and chocolate companies, [we] are at a competitive disadvantage to companies that source cheap cocoa produced with forced child labor. The higher production costs associated with compliance with international human rights norms require [us] to sell chocolate at higher prices.”30 If other firms are operating with **legally sourced labor**, they **will be less likely to sustain profits and compete** in markets where some firms are illegally benefiting from cheaper labor. Economic scholars Kynak et al. argue that, “The competitive environment, heating up with the emergence of new and powerful competitors in the markets with regard to all sectors, tempts entities to perform unethical maneuvers in their commercial relations with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage.”31 Unethical maneuvers to gain competitive advantage in the market are often hard to detect and costly to investigate. Indeed, “transaction and auditing costs of the entities increase due to the fact that such operations based on the derivation of unfair advantage are difficult to detect.”32 As mentioned above, becoming a Fair Trade certified brand requires rigorous standards and will increase the cost to the firm for goods sold. This includes associated overhead costs. Other certifications for sustainability such as the B Lab, which includes similar standards for labor within the supply chain, represent high costs to firms who decide to engage in such third-party labels.33 While these certifications are not necessary for firms to engage in ethical practices, they represent the overall cost disadvantage for firms that refuse to compromise ethical sourcing standards for price cuts. Thus, for this reason, national **antitrust legislation can define the federal** government’s **obligation to address forced labor in supply chains**, and provide additional context in courts for understanding the quantifiable damage done to free markets by illicit supply chain management.

# 1NR

#### They say they solve extinction --- Opposite is true – only regulation solves extinction

**Mazzucato 21** – Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London (UCL), where she is Founding Director of the UCL Institute for Innovation & Public Purpose (IIPP)

Mariana Mazzucato, “MISSION ECONOMY: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” Penguin Publisher, 1/28/21, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/315/315191/mission-economy/9780241419731.html

Greening the economy demands and deserves nothing less than a moonshot worthy of the mission. It is not a question of picking a series of outcomes that are only worthwhile for some market participants and disadvantage others. Solving climate change must be transformative across the entire economy. Public, private and civil actors alike will have to shift their mindset from short-term gains to long-run outcomes and profits, particularly against the background of financial stability and transition risks that form the landscape of climate change. Industrial strategies don’t just need different goals: they need missions.

Imagine if we were to bring the courage, spirit of experimentation and willpower of the moonshot to bear on the greatest problem of our time: the climate emergency. Imagine having leaders who proudly declare: ‘We choose to fight climate change in this decade not because it is easy, but because it is hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.’14

Around the world, there is increasing talk about the need for a Rooseveltian scale of investment to battle climate change. The notion of the Green New Deal consciously evokes the New Deal policies that began to lift the USA out of the Great Depression. A Green New Deal is about transforming production, distribution and consumption across the economy. It must be underpinned by long-term, patient finance which is willing to take risks and able to mobilize and crowd in other investors. This is key, as business investment reacts to the perception of where future opportunities lie: the climate emergency can be both a carrot and a stick to create a new direction of opportunities for the global economy. But where do we begin?

The mission map above on carbon-neutral cities (Figure 7) shows that a green transformation is not just about renewable energy. It’s also about achieving a cross-sectoral approach to innovation whose goal is to build a diverse portfolio of mission projects that engage multiple sectors and spur experimentation by as many different types of organizations. Similarly, the mission map on the future of mobility (Figure 9) spans different sectors that could alter how citizens travel, from innovations in the way that disabled people access ramps to new forms of public transport, public data practices and e-governance.

But, crucially, vision and leadership are needed. In 2019 we saw public figures on two continents take this on in two different ways. In the USA Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a Democratic Congresswoman for New York, and Ed Markey, a Democratic Senator from Massachusetts, introduced a Green New Deal to kick-start a new type of US growth based on missions that would eliminate all US carbon emissions. In Europe, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EU Commission, announced the launch of the European Green Deal, which advocated policy initiatives aimed at making Europe climate-neutral by 2050.15 ‘This is Europe’s man on the moon moment,’ she declared.16

The Green New Deal in the USA set a clear direction for its mission and established targeted, measurable and timebound goals. The resolution Senator Markey and Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez introduced into Congress called for a ‘ten-year national mobilization’ towards reaching goals such as ‘meeting 100 per cent of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources’. The ultimate goal was to stop using fossil fuels entirely and to move away from nuclear energy.

Within the mission, the targets included ‘upgrading all existing buildings’ in the country for energy efficiency; working with farmers ‘to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions ... as much as is technologically feasible’ (while supporting family farms and promoting ‘universal access to healthy food’); overhauling transportation systems to reduce emissions – including expanding electric car-manufacturing, building ‘charging stations everywhere’, and expanding high-speed rail to reduce national air travel. On top of that, the mission has social goals, including a guaranteed job with a family- sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations and retirement security’ and ‘high-quality health care’ for all Americans.17

#### Ur indict is from a blog --- Here is an indict of ur indict

Shetterly 17, WillShetterly a writer and fellow communist that also writes on this blog August 22, 2017, “Identity crisis: Leftist anti-wokeness is bullshit,” <https://libcom.org/blog/identity-crisis-leftist-anti-wokeness-bullshit-22082017>)

I give you credit for addressing Reed, but your **ideological filter** is keeping you from seeing many things. Here's a hasty response: 1. When Reed says, "I’m increasingly convinced that a likely reason is that the race line is itself a class line..." he's pointing to a truth: The class system provides a structure for racism. In the US today, we do not have a racial system that's separate from the class system as existed during Jim Crow or in apartheid South Africa. Instead, racism affects Americans within the class system like an extra weight that some members must bear. 2. The Black Panthers were working in the black community, but they rejected identity politics while fighting racism, just as Malcolm X did after he left the Nation of Islam. For example: “Working class people of all colors must unite against the exploitative, oppressive ruling class. Let me emphasize again — we believe our fight is a class struggle, not a race struggle.” — Bobby Seale, co-founder Black Panther Party And here's the Hampton quote with the parts that don't fit your thesis: “We got to face some facts. That the masses are poor, that the masses belong to what you call the lower class, and when I talk about the masses, I’m talking about the white masses, I’m talking about the black masses, and the brown masses, and the yellow masses, too. We’ve got to face the fact that some people say you fight fire best with fire, but we say you put fire out best with water. We say you don’t fight racism with racism. We’re gonna fight racism with solidarity. We say you don’t fight capitalism with no black capitalism; you fight capitalism with socialism.” —Fred Hampton 3. You say, "Reed has also dismissed “intersectionality” specifically, reducing it to merely campus activism and simply an extension of neo-liberal identity politics, ignoring that it emerged as the work of black feminists addressing specifically the failures of struggles in the ‘60s." "Intersectionality" was coined by Kimberle Crenshaw who, like her mentor Derrick Bell, was trying to address a social problem while rejecting the anti-capitalism of people like King and Malcolm X. She is a bourgeois black feminist who has not said anything in support of socialism that I've been able to find. Why any socialist would think the concepts of the bourgeoisie are good when they come from its black members, I have not a clue, and yet some do. You might ask yourself why neoliberals love Crenshaw's approach. David Harvey has the answer in his book on neoliberalism: "Neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multi-culturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice through the conquest of state power. It has long proved extremely difficult within the US left, for example, to forge the collective discipline required for political action to achieve social justice without offending the desire of political actors for individual freedom and for full recognition and expression of particular identities. Neoliberalism did not create these distinctions, but it could easily exploit, if not foment, them." —David Harvey